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Abstract: User authentication is a crucial service in wireless sensor networks (WSNs) that 
is becoming increasingly common in WSNs because wireless sensor nodes are typically 
deployed in an unattended environment, leaving them open to possible hostile network 
attack. Because wireless sensor nodes are limited in computing power, data storage and 
communication capabilities, any user authentication protocol must be designed to operate 
efficiently in a resource constrained environment. In this paper, we review several 
proposed WSN user authentication protocols, with a detailed review of the M.L Das protocol 
and a cryptanalysis of Das’ protocol that shows several security weaknesses. Furthermore, 
this paper proposes an ECC-based user authentication protocol that resolves these 
weaknesses. According to our analysis of security of the ECC-based protocol, it is suitable 
for applications with higher security requirements. Finally, we present a comparison of 
security, computation, and communication costs and performances for the proposed 
protocols. The ECC-based protocol is shown to be suitable for higher security WSNs. 
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1. Introduction  
As wireless communication technology has matured, the deployment of Wireless Sensor Networks 
(WSNs) has become more common. Wireless communication is a natural fit for sensor networks for 
the following reasons: it reduces the cost of infrastructure, allowing sensor networks to be deployed in 
areas that were once cost prohibitive and it allows a greater range of applications than fixed location 
sensor networks [1]. WSNs are now providing economical solutions in a host of diverse industries: 
electric utilities use WSNs for remote voltage monitoring, museums use WSNs for humidity 
monitoring and control, health care providers use WSNs for patient monitoring and notification, and 
they are in use in the military. Other applications include environment tracking and habitat monitoring, 
etc. [2-5].  
A key requirement for WSN is user authentication [6,7]. The client devices (remote wireless sensor 
nodes) need to be authenticated before being allowed to join the WSN and have access to the WSN’s 
resources. To date, most user authentication methods have focused on protocol implementations in the 
network and link layers. Accordingly, we propose an efficient protocol implementation in the WSN 
application layer. It should be noted that, in order to limit power consumption by sensor nodes and to 
overcome limitations in computation capacity, user authentication in a WSN is typically done in 
dedicated gateway node (GW-node) [8]. 
Sastry and Wagner [9] proposed a security enhancement using access control lists (ACL’s) in the 
GW node. In addition to verifying a client’s identity and arranging the nearest sensor node, an ACL 
would be maintained. The ACL would be limited to 255 entries. Watro et al. [10] proposed a complex 
mathematical method for user authentication employing RSA and Diffie-Hellman algorithms to 
calculate an encrypted public key (TinyPK authentication), but this protocol is open to hostile attack 
by a user masquerading as a sensor node (spoofing). Wong et al. [11] proposed a less complex,   
light-weight, dynamic user authentication method using a hash-based protocol. Their method 
recommended using the security features of the IEEE 802.15.4 MAC sublayer. Das [12] and Tseng  
et al. [13] pointed out that both Watro’s and Wong’s user authentication methods were vulnerable to 
stolen-verifier, replay, and forgery attacks (made possible by allowing multiple users with a single 
login ID). Das [12] proposed a two factor method of user authentication. This method is designed to 
protect against the aforementioned stolen-verifier, replay, and forgery attacks. Tseng et al. [13] further 
pointed out that Wong’s method was vulnerable to stolen passwords and that Wong’s method 
prevented users from freely changing their password. Tseng et al. proposed an enhanced user 
authentication method that is design to prevent the various attacks and to reduce the vulnerability to 
stolen passwords. Khan et al. [14,15] and Chen et al. [16] reviewed the Das two factor method and 
found additional security issues. Chen et al. [16] proposed a more secure and robust two-factor user 
authentication in WSNs. Unfortunately, we find that the Chen et al. proposal fails to provide a secure 
method for updating user passwords and is vulnerable to the insider attack problem. 
To address all of the issues raised in the above studies, we propose a novel user authentication 
protocol for wireless sensor networks, using Elliptic Curves Cryptography (ECC) and smart cards. Our 
proposal addresses the key security issues, while at the same time reducing computational load 
requirements. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we review the Das 
method and perform a detailed cryptanalysis of that method; next we present the ECC-based Sensors 2011, 11  
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authentication protocol (EAP) for WSNs in Section 3. In Section 4, we present a security and 
performance analysis of the related protocols. Then, in Section 5, we provide some concluding remarks. 
2. Related Works 
2.1. Review of Das’ Scheme 
This section provides a brief review of the Das method and analyzes its protocol. Before this 
analysis we first summarize in Table 1 the notations used throughout this paper and their 
corresponding definitions.  
Table 1. Notations.  
Symbol Definition 
U A  user 
ID  A user’s identity 
PW  A user’s password 
DID  A user’s dynamic login identity 
GW-node  Gateway node of WSN 
Sn  Nearest sensor node of WSN 
h(.)  A secure one-way hash function 
xa  A permanent secret parameter generated securely by the GW-node and stored in some defined 
sensor nodes before deploying the WSN 
K  A symmetric key of GW-node which shared between the GW-node, users and the sensor nodes 
||  A string concatenation operation 
⊕  A string XOR operation 
֜ A  secure  channel 
→  A public channel 
 
Das’ protocol involves the registration phase, login phase and verification phase, and can be briefly 
described as follows: 
(1) Registration phase: 
In this phase, a user Ui submits his/her IDi and PWi to the GW-node in a secured manner. Then, the 
GW-node issues a license to Ui. The steps are described as follows: 
Step 1: Ui ֜ GW-node:{IDi, PWi}. A Ui enters an identity IDi and a password PWi and then sends 
{IDi, PWi} to the GW-node using a secure channel.  
Step 2: GW-node ֜ smart card of Ui :{ h(.), IDi , Ni , h(PWi ), xa }. The GW-node computes  
Ni = h(IDi || PWi)⊕h(K) after receiving the registration request. Then, the GW-node 
personalizes the smart card with parameters {h(.), IDi, Ni, h(PWi), xa}. Ui receives the smart 
card information using a secure channel. 
(2) Login phase:  
When user Ui enters an IDi and a PWi in order to carry out some inquiry or to access data from the 
WSN, the smart card must confirm the validity of Ui according to the following steps: Sensors 2011, 11  
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Step 1: Validate Ui. The entered IDi and PWi are validated against the ID and PW stored on the 
user’s smart card. If Ui’s identification validation fails, the smart card will terminate this 
request. 
Step 2: Ui’s smart card calculates DIDi and Ci. 
DIDi = h(IDi || PWi)⊕h(xa|| T), where T is the login system timestamp. 
Ci = h(Ni || xa || T). 
Step 3: Ui→GW-node:{DIDi, Ci, T}. 
{DIDi, Ci, T} is transmitted to the GW-node via public channel. 
(3a) Verification phase (gateway node):  
When the GW-node receives a login request {DIDi, Ci, T} at time T*, the GW-node performs the 
following steps to verify the identity of Ui: 
Step 1: Validates if T*−T < ΔT. 
If (T* − T) ≤ ΔT then the validity of T can be certain, and the GW-node proceeds to the next 
step. Otherwise, the GW-node rejects the request. Here, ΔT denotes the expected time 
interval for transmission delay. 
Step 2: Calculates Ci*. 
h(IDi || PWi)* = DIDi⊕h(xa || T) 
Ci* = h(h(IDi || PWi)* || h(K) || xa || T). 
Step 3: Confirms whether the Ci = Ci *. 
If the Ci = Ci*, then the GW-node accepts the login request and sends a request to Sn. 
Step 4: GW-node→Sn:{DIDi, Ai, T'}. 
The GW-node calculates Ai = h(DIDi || Sn || xa || T') and transmits a request {DIDi, Ai, T'} to 
Sn over a public channel. T' is the GW-node request timestamp. Ai is generated using the xa 
parameter, thus the value of Ai can be used by Sn to ensure that the message originates from 
a valid GW-node. 
(3b) Verification phase (sensor node):  
When Sn receives request {DIDi, Ai, T'} at time T, Sn performs the following steps to verify the 
validity of the request: 
Step 1: Validates if T – T’ < ΔT. 
If (T – T’) ≤ ΔT then the validity of T' can be certain, and Sn proceeds to the next step. 
Step 2: Recalculates Ai. 
Ai = h(DIDi || Sn || xa || T')  
Step 3: Confirms whether the value of the locally calculated Ai is the same as the value of Ai in the 
GW-node request.  
If the value of the locally calculated Ai is the same as the value of Ai in the GW-node request, then 
Sn responds to Ui’s original request. Otherwise, Sn rejects the request. Sensors 2011, 11  
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2.2. Cryptanalysis of Das’ Protocol  
Recently, several studies have analyzed security flaws in Das’ scheme [14-16]. In this section, we 
also discuss the requirements of security in WSNs and describe the primary flaw of Das’ protocol (it 
omits mutual authentication) and several secondary security issues [14-16]. 
2.2.1. Security Requirements in Wireless Sensor Networks 
Sastry and Wagner [9] noted several problems with regard to the security of user authentication 
provided by IEEE 802.15.4 [17]. They cited ACL management problems, loss of ACL state due to 
power interruptions, and key management problems. They concluded that IEEE 802.15.4 provides 
insufficient user authentication security and provided some solutions for the noted problems. However, 
above and beyond the security issues noted by Sastry and Wagner, there are two additional security 
issues that must be addressed: 
  Secure user authentication in WSNs should include, to the extent possible, methods for 
addressing application layer issues such as masquerade, replay, and forgery attacks. 
  Secure user authentication in WSNs should be based on mutual authentication. 
2.2.2. No Mutual Authentication 
Because Das’ protocol does not provide mutual authentication [14-16], a malicious user can attack a 
WSN that uses the Das protocol by means of eavesdropping and masquerading. The attack could be 
accomplished as follows: 
(i)   Ui sends the message {DIDi, Ci, T} to the GW-node for accessing the WSN. 
(ii)  The GW-node sends the message {DIDi, Ai, T} to Sn for asking the service for Ui. 
(iii) The attacker captures the message {DIDi, Ai, T} via eavesdropping. 
(iv)     The attacker provides an SM which masquerades as Sn to get the Ui’s request data or hold back 
the request. 
(v)  Since SM co-works with Ui continuously, the Ui access requests will continue to fail.  
With the Das method, after accepting the login request of Ui, the GW-node sends a   
message {DIDi,  Ai,  T’} to some nearest sensor node Sn. Here the value of Ai is computed by   
Ai = h(DIDi || Sn || xa || T’), where T' is the current timestamp of GW-node. The value of Ai is used to 
assure the sensor node that the message has come from the real GW-node. The GW-node message 
directs the sensor node to reply to the query with the data which Ui has requested. However, there is no 
mechanism for the GW-node to be assured that the reply message was initiated from the queried sensor 
node. Thus, the Das-scheme only provides unilateral authentication between the GW-node and sensor 
node. There is no mutual authentication between the two nodes. 
2.2.3. No Protection against Insider Attacks 
Nowadays users use a single common password for accessing different applications or servers. The 
situation is common practice and this is done for their convenience. It relieves the user from having to 
remember multiple passwords. Nevertheless, if the system manager or a privileged user of the   Sensors 2011, 11  
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GW-node obtains the common password of Ui, he/she may try to impersonate Ui by accessing other 
servers where Ui could be a registered user. In the Das scheme [14,15], Ui performs registration with 
the GW-node by presenting a password in plain format. Thus, the Das protocol does not provide 
sufficient protection against an insider attack on a GW-node by a privileged user. 
2.2.4. No Provision for Changing/Updating Passwords 
The fixed password is definitely suffered from threats than an updating password. It is a widely 
recommended security policy, for highly secure applications, that users should update or change their 
passwords frequently. In the scheme [14,15], there is no provision for a user to easily change his/her 
password. 
2.2.5. No Protection against Forgery Attacks 
A legal user of the system can launch a forgery attack against the WSN by eavesdropping and 
masquerading. A forgery attack can be launched as follows [16]: 
(i)  A legal user of the system U* can login to the WSN at TA and TB accurately. 
(ii) Suppose U* has embedded a synchronized Trojan virus into legal user Ui’s system. 
(iii)When  Ui wants to login to the WSN at TA and TB,  U* can eavesdrop on the messages   
{DIDi, Ci, TA } and {DIDi, Ci, TB } between the GW-node and Ui at TA and TB. To judge which 
message is DIDi or Ci as follows: 
 Step  1.U* can obtain the following messages: DIDi(TA) = h(IDi || PWi)⊕h(xa || TA) and  
 DIDi(TB) = h(IDi || PWi)⊕h(xa || TB). 
  Step 2. And then U* can forge the dynamic login identity DID*(TA) and DID*(TB).  
 DID*(TA) = h(ID* || PW*)⊕h(xa || TA)  
 DID*(TB) = h(ID* || PW*)⊕h(xa || TB). 
(iv)   U* can use the login phase formula to compute DIDi(TB), where DIDi(TB) is calculated as 
DIDi(TB) = DIDi(TA)⊕DID
*(TA)⊕DID
*(TB) DIDi(TB) = h(IDi ||PWi)⊕h(xa || TA)⊕ h(ID*||PW*)
⊕ h(xa || TA)⊕ h(ID*||PW*)⊕h(xa ||TB)  
(v) After U* obtains Ui’s DIDi(TB), U* sends a new session message {DIDi(TB), Ci, TS} withinΔT 
timestamp for a new login request. The timestamp TS, where TS = TB, is made by U* for attack 
on the WSN. 
(vi)  Thus, the GW-node will verify message {DIDi(TB), Ci, TS } from U* with following steps: 
 U *→GW-node:{DIDi(TB), Ci, TS} 
  Step 1. The GW-node receives {DIDi(TB), Ci, TS} at T* and checks for T* − T S < ΔT. The  
GW-node passes the verification and proceeds to the next step. 
 ( T* − TB < ΔT is known and TS = TB was made arbitrarily by U*)  
  Step 2. The GW-node calculates h(IDi || PWi)
* = DIDi(TB) ⊕ h(xa || T) and obtains   
Ci* = h(h(IDi || PWi)
*|| h(K)|| xa || T) (Ci*= Ci) to pass the verification and proceed to the 
remaining steps. 
Consequently, the Das protocol does not provide sufficient protection against a forgery attack by a 
legal user. Sensors 2011, 11  
 
 
4773
3. ECC-Based Authentication Protocol (EAP) for WSN 
This section proposes a more efficient authentication mechanism using ECC. First, we review the 
fundamentals of Elliptic Curves and then survey the Elliptic Curves Cryptography (ECC) which is 
suitable for our construction of a secured authentication protocol for wireless sensor networks. The 
proposed five phases will be described later. The overall handshake of the proposed protocol is illustrated 
in Figure 1. The GW-node, Sn and user use the h(xQ||xi||xS) as a session key with communication 
handshakes. 
Figure 1. Communication handshakes of the proposed scheme. 
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3.1. ECC Based Authentication Protocol  
In 1985 Miller and Kobiltz proposed a secure and efficient elliptic curve cryptosystem (ECC) [17,18]. 
Because ECC provides a smaller key size than any other cryptosystem, it is suitable for application in 
smart card and wireless systems.  
An elliptic curve is a cubic equation of the form:  e dx cx x by axy y       
2 3 2 :,  w h e r e  
e d c b a , , , , are real numbers. With regard to cryptography, we focus on the finite field of ECC and aim 
mainly at the prime p of elliptic curve group. The mathematical equation of ECC satisfies the 
form: p b ax x y E mod ) ( :
3 2    , where 0 ) 27 4 (
2 3   b a . Let Fp denote the finite field of points, 
where p is a large prime number and containing  b a y x , , ,  elements. The equation points and the point 
at infinity O compose the elliptic curve group over real numbers. We find a large prime number n such 
that  n  P  =  O using the elliptic curve addition algorithm. Here,    denotes an elliptic curve 
multiplication. The arithmetic of elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP) is given points Q 
and P, where Q, P Fp and are both publicly known, determine the random number K, 0 < K < n-1, 
and compute Q as : Q =KP is satisfies. It is hard to determine K given Q and P, namely, ECDLP is a 
complex mathematical problem such that the security is achieved. The analog of Diffie-Hellman key 
exchange uses elliptic curve characteristics to complete key exchange. The key exchange between UA 
and UB can be done as follows [18-20]:  
(i)  The user UA chooses a random integer rA as a private key, where rA < n and computes the public 
key QA as:  P r Q A A   . Then, UA sends QA to the user UB.  
(ii) The user UB selects a random integer rB as a private key, where rB < n and computes the public 
key QB as:  P r Q B B   .UB sends QB to UA. 
(iii)  UA can compute shared key KA =  P r r Q r B A B A      and  UB can compute shared key   
KB = P r r Q r A B A B     . In this manner we find KA = KB. 
3.2. Registration Phase 
This phase is invoked whenever user Ui performs registration with the WSN. Then, Ui submits  
{IDi, PWB} to the GW-node by the secured channel. Then, the GW-node performs the license to Ui. 
The following steps are performed to complete this phase: 
Step 1: Ui ֜ GW-node:{IDi, PWB}. 
Ui chooses his/her IDi and PWi password and randomly chooses a large number b for computing 
PWB = h(PWi ⊕b).  
Step 2: After receiving the registration request, the GW-node computes KIDi = qs × H 1(IDi)  Gp, 
where KIDi is Ui’s authentication key and Gp denotes a cyclic addition group of P.  
Step 3: GW-node selects a base point P with the order n over Ep(a, b) , where n is a large number 
for the security considerations. Then, the GW node derives its private/public key pair (qs, QS) 
by computing QS = qs × P. (Here × denotes an elliptic curve multiplication). 
Step 4: GW node computes Bi = h(IDi⊕PWB) and Wi = h(PWB || IDi )⊕KIDi. 
Step 5: GW-node ֜ smart card of Ui :{ Bi, Wi, h(·), b, H1(.), H2(.), H3(.)}. Sensors 2011, 11  
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GW-node  stores {Bi, W i, h (·),  H1(.),  H2(.),  H3(.)} on a smart card and sends the smart card   
to  Ui over a secure channel. Here H1(.),  H2(.) and H3(.) are one-way hash functions,   
H1(.): {0, 1}Gp, H 2(.):{0,1}
*
P Z  and H3(.):{0,1}
*
P Z . 
Step 6: Upon Ui receiving the smart card, Ui stores the random number b in the smart card. Such 
that the smart card contains {Bi, Wi, h(·), b, H1(.), H2(.), H3(.)}. 
3.3. Login Phase 
Assume that Ui enters in order to ask a service from the network, the smart card must perform the 
following steps to validate the legality of Ui:  
Step 1: Ui enters his/her IDi and PWi to login to obtain the message for GW-node request. 
Step 2: Ui computes PWB = h(PWi⊕b) and Bi’ = h(IDi⊕PWB) and checks whether Bi’ = Bi. If it 
holds, U i computes Q = h(PWB||IDi) and KIDi = Wi⊕Q.  
When the login request has been accepted, the user proceeds with the remaining steps: 
Step 1: After Ui obtaining his/her authentication key KIDi,  Ui chooses a random point   
Ri = (x i, yi)  EP (a, b), where x i and y i are x and y coordinating point of Ri. 
Step 2: Ui computes  ) ( 1 2 1 T H t   , M i =R i + t1 × KIDi and Ri
* = x i × P at the timestamp T1.  
Step 3: Ui →GW-node: {T1, IDi, Mi, Ri
*}. 
Ui sends message Msg(T1, IDi, M i, Ri
*) to GW-node. 
3.4. Verification Phase 
After receiving the login request message Msg(T1, IDi, Mi, Ri
*) at T1 through the nearest sensor node 
(Sn), the GW-node executes the following steps to verify the user Ui: 
Step 1: Compute QIDi and Ri’ 
GW-node performs the following computations to obtain QIDi = (xQ, yQ) and Ri’ = (xi’, yi’)  
of Ui. 
QIDi = H1 (IDi) 
) ( 1 2 1 T H t   
R i’ = Mi − qs× t1× QIDi 
Step 2: The GW node verifies whether Ri
* = x i’ × P. If it holds, U i is authenticated by GW-node.  
Step 3: GW-node→ Ui: {T2, MS, Mk} through Sn. 
The GW node chooses a random point RS = (xS, yS)  EP (a, b) and computes ) ( 2 2 2 T H t  ,  
MS =RS + t2× qs× QIDi, session key k = H3 (xQ || xi || xS) and Mk = (k + xS) × P.  
GW-node sends a message Msg(T2, MS, Mk) through the public channel in order to respond to the 
request of Sn at the timestamp T2. 
3.5. Mutual Authentication Phase 
The GW-node sends Msg(T2, MS, Mk) to the Sn and then Sn sends Msg(ACC-LOGIN) to the   
GW-node. The steps are described as follows: Sensors 2011, 11  
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Step 1: Compute QIDi and R’S 
After receiving Msg(T2, MS, Mk), the Sn execution obtains the following computation  
QIDi = (xQ, yQ) and R’S = (x’S, y’S) of the GW-node. 
QIDi = H1 (IDi) 
) ( 2 2 2 T H t   
R’S = MS −  2 t × KIDi 
Step 2: Sn computes k’ = H3 (xQ|| x i || x’S) and M’k= (k’ + x’S) × P to verify whether M’k = Mk. If it 
holds, GW-node is successfully authenticated by Sn. 
3.6. The Password-Changing Phase 
When a user Ui enters an IDi and a PWi in order to request a password change, the smart card must 
compute a new value of PWB
*
 = h(PWi 
*⊕b) to the GW-node. After receiving the password change 
request, the GW-node computes Bi
* and Wi
*
. 
Step 1: GW-node computes Bi
* = h(IDi⊕PWB
*) and Wi
* = h(PWB
* || IDi)⊕KIDi.  
Step 2: GW-node stores the new vale on smart card. 
The smart card replaces the original values of Bi, W i with the new value Bi
*,  Wi
*  and  
PWB
* = h(PWi 
*⊕b). 
4. Security and Performance Analysis 
4.1. Security Analysis  
The studies we have referenced in this paper have discussed the security issues of remote user 
authentication. Below is a summary of those security issues, along with the reasons we believe our 
proposed ECC protocol can address those issues. 
Resistance to insider attack: It is common practice for users to apply the same common password 
to access different applications. If a privileged insider has knowledge of another user Ui’s password, it 
hey may try to impersonate user Ui to access network applications. Our proposed protocol registers 
user Ui using cipher code PWB = h(PWi⊕b) over a secure channel. This provides protection against 
stolen passwords. Thus, our protocol resists insider attacks.  
Resistance to masquerade attack: To successfully complete a masquerade attack, an attacker must 
know Ui’s password in order to pass verification in the login phase and to be able to interpret the 
verification message correctly for mutual authentication. An attacker, even a legitimate user U*, 
cannot masquerade as a different legitimate user Ui without Ui’s password for forging the messages 
sent to the GW-node. 
Mutual authentication: Mutual authentication is an important feature for a verification service that 
is resistant to server spoofing attacks. Our protocol provides a mutual authentication between the user 
Ui and the GW-node by using ECC-based public and private keys exchange.  
Securely change/update password: There is provision for users to update or change their password 
in our proposed scheme. Namely, a user can send a new password to the GW-node and then the  
GW-node computes new value of Bi
*, Wi
* and stores them on the smart card. Sensors 2011, 11  
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We recall that the protocol [12-16] of Wong et al. does not provide for mutual authentication, and 
can be vulnerable to forgery and replay attacks. Besides, the proposal of Watro et al. has security 
weaknesses against masquerade attacks, and Das’ protocol does not provide mutual authentication with 
an authenticated procedure using the hash function. Further, the weaknesses of Das’ scheme are that it 
may suffer from an insider attack and a forgery attack. Chen et al.’s scheme is similar in Das’ scheme, 
and also has the insider attack problem. Besides, the referenced proposals all fail to provide a secure 
method for updating user passwords. Table 2 compares our proposed protocol with the other 
referenced protocols in terms of protection against attacks. When compared against each other, our 
protocol provides a solution for user authentication that is more secure than the other referenced 
protocols. 
Table 2. Security comparison among the referenced protocols. 
Item Proposed  Chen  et al.’s Das’  Watro  et al.’s Wong  et al.’s
Avoiding insider attack  Yes  No  No  Yes  Yes 
Securely change/update 
password 
Yes No No No  No 
Avoiding forgery attack  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  No 
Mutual  authentication  Yes Yes No Yes  No 
Avoiding masquerade attack  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  Yes 
Avoiding replay attack  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
Avoiding guessing attack  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
4.2. Performance Analysis  
For comparing performance between our protocol and related protocols, we estimate the 
computation costs. In the definition of computation costs, we define the notation th as the hash 
computation time, tPA as the elliptic curve point addition computation time, tPM as the elliptic curve 
point multiplication computation time, tE as the elliptic curve polynomial computation time, tPR as the 
private key computation time, and tPU as the public key computation time. Note that the computation 
costs of tPU and tPR are considerably higher than th (tPU >> th and tPR >> th) because tPU and tPR usually 
need polynomial computation cost to obtain the public and private keys. Obviously, tE, tPA, tPM 
calculates a cubic equation at most and th calculates a linear equation or quadratic equation at most. 
The comparison of related protocols is illustrated in Table 3. 
When considering the computation cost in the authentication phase (which includes the verification 
and mutual authentication phases), our protocol requires only 11 th + 4 tPA + 6 tPM + 2 tE. That is, our 
protocol needs one point addition operation, four point multiplication operations and one polynomial 
operation in ECC. However, Watro et al.’s protocol needs two hash functions and four polynomial 
computations for private key and public key computation. It uses complex RSA and Diffie-Hellman 
algorithms for user authentication. The polynomial computation time calculates a prime exponential 
function which is considerably higher than cubic equation [12,17]. In addition, Watro et al.’s protocol 
needs four polynomial computations, for tPR and tPU, are more than the other referenced protocols [12-16]. 
Besides, our proposed protocol is computed through combination of point addition and point Sensors 2011, 11  
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multiplication, point multiplication is defined by repeated addition. Considering the computation costs, 
ECC can generate smaller key sizes but maintain equivalent levels of security with RSA [18-20]. This 
is the reason the ECC-based protocol is more practical than Watro et al.’s protocol. 
Lastly, when considering the communication cost, the proposed protocol has higher computation 
cost than other protocols, except for Watro et al.’s protocol. However, the protocol of Das does not 
provide mutual authentication. The method we propose solves most of the Das method problems. 
Furthermore, although Das’s scheme needs five hash computation operations, Wong’s needs four hash 
computation operations and Chen et al.’s protocol performs wireless sensor networking using seven th, 
their protocols suffer from security issues. Our proposed protocol addresses these issues and provides 
better security than the other related protocols.  
Table 3. Performance comparison among related protocols.  
  Proposed Chen  et al. Das  Watro  et al. Wong  et al. 
Authentication 
(Verification and Mutual 
Authentication) 
11 th + 4 tPA +  
6 tPM + 2 tE 
7 th 5th 2th+2tPR+2tPU 4th 
5. Conclusions  
In this paper, we have analyzed Das’ scheme for user authentication in WSNs. The Das protocol, 
which does not provide mutual authentication, is susceptible to insider and forgery attacks. We have 
also reviewed the protocols of Wong et al., which is vulnerable to forgery and replay attacks, of Watro 
et al., which is vulnerable to masquerade attacks, and Chen et al.’s protocol, which is susceptible to 
insider attacks. Additionally, a user cannot change his/her password with the former schemes. Since 
WSNs needs more efficient methods to perform mutual authentication in an insecure network 
environment, we use an ECC-based mechanism to accomplish this. The proposed protocol can prevent 
all the problems of the former schemes and provide mutual authentication to protect inside security and 
outside security. Furthermore, it not only inherits the merits of ECC-based mechanism but also 
enhances the WSN authentication with higher security than other protocols. Therefore, the proposed 
protocol is more suited to WSNs environments. 
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